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From the organization to the division of cognitive labor† 
Fred D’Agostino 
I. Introduction 
In influential work, Philip Kitcher (1990; 1993; 2001) set an agenda and established a method 
for understanding some ways in which individuals’ diversity might be tapped to enhance the 
production and assessment of knowledge. His account of “social epistemology” (cp. Fuller, 
1988) remains a powerful point of departure. He said (1993, p. 303): 
The general problem of social epistemology, as I conceive it, is to identify the properties of epistemically 
well-designed social systems, that is, to specify the conditions under which a group of individuals, operat-
ing according to various rules for modifying their individual practices, succeed, through their interactions, 
in generating a progressive sequence of consensus practices. 
Kitcher had in effect taken up some earlier remarks by Thomas Kuhn about the role which 
diversity might play in the formation of knowledge in communities of enquiry. (Cp. 
D’Agostino 1993; 1996; 2005a.) In particular, Kuhn’s so-called “risk-spreading argument” 
(D’Agostino, 2005a; Rueger, 1996) clearly articulates a specific situation in which “a group 
of individuals … [might] succeed, through their interactions, in generating a progressive se-
quence of consensus practices”, particularly by spreading the risk of adopting a new theory by 
having only some members of the community do that (while others remain committed to the 
existing theory). Kuhn says (1970, p. 186): 
[I]ndividual variability in the application of shared values may serve functions essential to science. The 
points at which values must be applied are invariably also those at which risks must be taken. Most 
anomalies are resolved by normal means; most proposals for new theories do prove to be wrong. If all 
members of a community responded to each anomaly as a source of crisis or embraced each new theory 
advanced by a colleague, science would cease. If, on the other hand, no one reacted to anomalies or 
brand-new theories in high-risk ways, there would be few or no revolutions. In matters like these the re-
sort to shared values rather than to shared rules governing individual choice may be the community’s way 
of distributing risk and assuring the long-term success of its enterprise. 
It is this possibility—that the diverse ways in which individual enquirers might evaluate and 
engage with problems and innovations—that Kitcher explored in a thorough, precise, and 
convincing manner in his major work in this area. 
In recent work, I have tried to tease out some implications of this general approach (without 
really overcoming those of its limitations which it is my main business to explore here). I 
reached several conclusions: 
• “[V]ariability in the application of shared [and narrowly ‘epistemic’] values” is formally 
adequate to explain why some members of a community of enquiry would adopt a positive 
and others a negative attitude towards, say, a proposed innovation. It is not necessary, on my 
account, as it seems to be on Kitcher’s, to invoke the influence of “sullied” (or at least non-
epistemic) motives—e.g. the desire for recognition by one’s peers. While my approach is re-
spectably Kuhnian, it is so partly because it is explicitly pluralist about epistemic values 
(D’Agostino, 2004b), which Kitcher’s account seems not to be. 
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• The dialectic between diversity and convergence (Kitcher’s “sequence of consensus 
practices”) can be managed via a notion of “dominance” (Laudan and Laudan, 1989), which, 
even when consensus has been achieved, permits a “residual diversity” (D’Agostino, 2000; 
2005a) that is a necessary prerequisite of further productive work. (Cp. Choo, 1998, p. xvii.) 
To say that agreement occurs when there is a dominant solution is to imply that, despite this 
convergence of judgement about the overall merits of the dominant option, there may never-
theless be an underlying divergence of more specific judgements—e.g. about the relative 
weight to be assigned to different evaluative criteria and, indeed, about the performance of 
various options in relation to these several criteria—and that this diversity may sustain future 
risk-spreading, since enquirers who disagree at this level may well make different assess-
ments in future choice situations. 
• Coordination of activity within a community of enquiry is therefore facilitated via a 
“shallow consensus” (D’Agostino, 2005b) which is mediated, specifically (D’Agostino, 
2005a), by the concreteness (and therefore multiple-interpretability) of the “paradigm” which 
serves as a point of departure for members of the community and by the control of their ac-
tivities, much as Hayek might have advised (1973-6), largely by proscriptive rather than pre-
scriptive rules (e.g. the “negative heuristic” of Lakatos (1970)). (This is a matter to which I 
will return in the section IV.2 below.) 
• The diversity which all these various analyses depend on can, finally, be understood 
(D’Agostino, forthcoming, sec. 6.1)  “endogenously”, rather than simply posited as a primi-
tive assumption of the model. Diversity is, in other words, generated in the system itself, 
given reasonable, and certainly non-counter-factual, assumptions about the makeup and his-
torical trajectory of the community.  
Kitcher’s original paper (1990) in this area was called “The Division of Cognitive Labor”. By 
the time of his 1993 book, a similar passage was headed “The Organization of Cognitive La-
bor”. For cognate material he used the phrase “Organizing Inquiry” in his 2001 book. This 
change of wording is significant, I think, because, in fact, Kitcher never really dealt with a 
proper division of labor, in the sense of Adam Smith (1893, Book I, ch. 1) or Karl Marx 
(1954, vol. I, ch.14). Neither did I in earlier work. What both of us (and others such as 
Rueger) were interested in was the way in which various individuals, having formed different 
evaluative attitudes towards a particular issue, might adopt different stances towards that is-
sue—e.g. might pursue the innovative or instead the conservative approach to a particular 
problem. What none of us did was consider whether, for example, a project of enquiry might 
be sub-divided into different tasks that could then be distributed across different individuals 
or teams within the community. But that, of course, is what’s required for a genuine division 
of labor in a cognitive or epistemic context, and I am going, in the remainder of this paper, to 
sketch a framework in which we could talk about such matters. I will do so in what may seem 
a rather circuitous way. I will consider, initially, some models from the management sciences, 
from biology, and from design theory. I will return, in section IV.2 below, to the issue of en-
quiry in a more general sense and in that more specific sense, associated particularly with sci-
ence, that Kitcher, Kuhn, and others have mostly had in mind. 
II. Background 
Those contemporary discussions of division of labor which recommend themselves to the phi-
losopher are not, alas, part of the philosophical literature even loosely construed. (The only 
“hits” on “division of labor” in The Philosopher’s Index that are relevant to the concerns ad-
dressed here are to Kitcher’s 1990 paper, and they are not particularly numerous.) The most 
interesting discussions, then, are from what we might call, broadly, the management science 
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literature and they include the following works: Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Pren-
cipe, 2005; Dosi, 1982; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Frenken, 2006; Kauffman, 1993; Ma-
rengo and Dosi, 2005; Marengo et al., 2000; Raghu et al., 2003; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; 
Von Hippel, 1990. (Kauffman is important and widely cited by others, but, it should be noted, 
writes as a biologist.) Most of these works share origins in or at least an orientation to the 
work of Herbert Simon (see e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972; Simon, 1969). The reason, in the 
form of a “slogan”, is obvious enough: Division of labor is a response to complexity given 
bounded rationality. It will be useful, however, to expound this slogan; doing so will enable 
me to present some apparatus that will prove useful and to associate the analysis presented 
here with broader issues of more general significance. 
1. Complexity and Evaluative Pluralism 
As it turns out, the kind of complexity that might ground a division of labor is closely related 
to the sort of deep evaluative pluralism articulated by Isaiah Berlin (1969) and John Gray 
(1993), whose basic ideas are easily summarised as follows. (Cp. D’Agostino 1990; 1991; 
1996; 2004a; 2004b.) 
1. There are, in many domains of evaluation, a plurality of different standards against which 
objects belonging to that domain need to be assessed. 
2. These standards will, in many cases, be interdependent, in the sense that modifying an ob-
ject in a way which changes its value against one standard may also change its value 
against another standard—and not always in the same “direction”; it will often, perhaps 
even characteristically, be the case that an object which is made better in one relevant re-
spect is, by that very fact, made worse in another also relevant respect.  
3. Because of this, we cannot (cp. D’Agostino, 1996, sec. 26 disputing some claims of Gaus, 
1990) identify the overall best object belonging to this domain simply by asking which 
object is best against each of the separate standards. There may, in fact, be no single ob-
ject which is best on all the standards. (Cp. Marengo and Dosi, 2005, p. 309.) 
4. In many cases, then, superiority against one standard will need to be “traded off” against 
inferiority against a second standard in order to (perhaps only partially) determine overall 
superiority. This will involve what I called (2003) a project of commensuration, in which 
we “price out” evaluative standards against one other, developing a common denominator 
in terms of which overall judgments of value can be made. 
All this, but especially the second point, is resonant with the biological idea of epistasis, 
which is, in turn, crucial to the definition of complexity in the technical sense which that term 
has recently assumed across a range of academic discourses. Koen Frenken provides a clear 
exposition (2006, p. 8, emphasis added): 
In biology, the distinction between the genotype and the phenotype is crucial to the understanding of evo-
lution through natural selection. Mutations occur in the genotype while natural selection operates on the 
ensemble of traits constituting the phenotype. Traits in turn affect the survival and reproductive success of 
a phenotype through which its genome (or part of it) is transmitted to its offspring. Epistasis between 
genes implies that a mutation may not only change the functional contribution of the mutated gene to the 
entire phenotype, but it generally affects the functional contribution of epistatically related genes to the 
phenotype as well. … Due to these dependencies among genes, a mutation in a single gene may have 
both positive effects on some traits and negative effects on other traits. 
In the presence of epistasis (or interdependence of standards), the ease with which or indeed 
the very possibility that we can identify an overall best object in a given domain of evaluation 
will depend, among other things, on the number of relevant standards and the degree to which 
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they exhibit these sorts of interdependencies.1 As Daniel Levinthal put it (Ethiraj and Levin-
thal, 2004, p. 161, emphasis added): 
The complexity here stems primarily from the often unknown nature and magnitude of interactions be-
tween different parts of the system and the consequent system performance implications. The nature of 
the interaction between two parts may be positive (increasing in one another), negative (decreasing in one 
another), or unrelated. Furthermore, the nature of the interaction may alternate between positive, negative, 
and unrelated over different ranges of interaction strength. As a result, overall system performance can 
exhibit highly nonlinear and/or nonmonotonic behaviour in response to changes in one or more parts. 
Stuart Kauffman (1993) has provided an influential model of these phenomena in which the 
idea of “NK fitness landscapes” is deployed and investigated, and of which Lee Altenberg’s 
1997 paper represents a useful generalization. According to these models, the complexity of 
the evaluative space defined by N standards with K interdependencies among them is linear in 
N and exponential in K, so that such a domain of evaluation is of magnitude NK. Epistasis, in 
other words, generates evaluative complexity in the sense that the evaluator, should she wish 
to consider the various options, will need to do so against quite a large and complexly struc-
tured space of possibilities in which it will not be easy to discover the option, among those 
she might consider or construct, which is best overall. 
Suppose, to make matters concrete, that there are 10 distinct standards in a particular domain 
of evaluation and that these standards are epistatically linked, e.g. by 7 interdependencies for 
each of the 10 distinct standards. Suppose too that we want to identify an overall best option 
in that domain. We might look at a particular option O and consider its value against one of 
these standards, S1. Perhaps it rates rather poorly against that standard. We might try to im-
prove it in some way, by transforming it to a successor, O′ so that it, O′, rated better against 
that standard. But if S1 is interdependent with seven other standards, then improving the op-
tion against S1 might degrade its performance against one or more of those other seven stan-
dards. Note, by the way, that these changes in value can “cascade” in complex ways. An im-
provement against S1 may degrade performance against S2, but degraded performance against 
S2 may be linked, epistatically, to improvement against S3, and so on. It will, accordingly, be 
no trivial matter to determine whether the transformation of O into O′ has led, in fact, to an 
overall improvement. Making such a determination will require us to develop or apply a sys-
tem of commensuration, or, in other words, a system of rates at which the standards trade off 
against one another in relation to the options for choice. It might require, in other words, that 
we “price out” the losses with respect to one standard against the gains with respect to an-
other. 
Notice, furthermore and as Levinthal reminds us, that the ways in which standards are inter-
dependent may be quite complex. Perhaps, at the specific locus at which the transformation 
from O to O′ leads to an S1-improvement, S1-improvements lead, in turn, to S2-degradations. 
Even so, there may be other loci where transformations leading to S1-improvements also lead 
to S2-improvements. Indeed, at other loci, the ways in which interdependencies cascade may 
also differ. And so on. 
Another proviso. We should not, of course, take too seriously the idea that an evaluative space 
is “given” and simply needs, for us to locate an optimum, to be traversed—however that 
might be arranged. (I return to this matter periodically and, in a reflective mode, in section V 
below.) The options occupying various loci in such a space may, in fact, have to be con-
structed, much as we imagined the construction of O′ from O. And it may not be evident, in-
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that such complex relations among evaluative standards are recognized, or at least asserted, 
by ethical “particularists” such as Jonathon Dancy (1993); indeed, Dancy’s particularism is grounded, precisely, 
in such complexity, not that, to my knowledge, he puts it that way himself. 
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deed, what the trade-offs among standards are until the various options have been constructed. 
Our preferences over options (and the trade-offs which underlie them) may themselves be 
constructed rather than taken as given (or even discovered). This point will prove to be sig-
nificant and reflects, I believe, some key ideas of decision cycles or constructed preferences 
theory (cp. e.g. Payne et al., 1999). It is certainly implicit in my idea that, in comparing op-
tions, we may sometimes need to establish first a mechanism for doing so … and then, to ef-
fect the comparison, to apply that mechanism.  
By the way, in distinguishing, implicitly, between the transformation of an object and conse-
quential changes to its overall worth on a high-dimension evaluative space, I am (via Frenken, 
2006, pp. 33-4) following Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984), in distinguishing between “technical” 
and “service” characteristics of the objects under assessment. For example, when we trans-
form an option O into a successor O′, we do so by changing something about that option. If it 
is a theory, then perhaps we add a parameter; if a physical object we are designing, then per-
haps we adjust one of its characteristics—e.g. size, color, etc. And, by making these “techni-
cal” changes, we affect the value (or its “service characteristics”) in various ways. Perhaps 
adding the parameter to the theory enables us to make more accurate predictions within a cer-
tain range. If predictive accuracy is an evaluative criterion for theories, then this change in 
technical characteristics induces a change in the service characteristics or, in our terminology, 
in the value, along a significant dimension, of the option in question. (Of course, adding a pa-
rameter may make the theory less simple and, if simplicity is also a standard for the evalua-
tion of theories, this interdependency contributes to the difficulty of making an overall evalua-
tion of the options.) 
2. The Geography of Complexity 
It is evident, perhaps, there are no realistic prospects for effectively and efficiently surveying 
a truly complex evaluative space. (This point is independent of, but is certainly strengthened 
by, the possibility that trade-offs and preferences (and options to be evaluated in terms of 
them) are constructed rather than given.) This is a way, in effect, of characterizing the bound-
edness of our rational engagement with such a space. To bring home the difficulties, for finite 
beings, in relation to complex evaluative spaces, we might consider the “geography” of such 
spaces. Marengo et al. (2000, p. 760, emphasis added), adapting Kaufmann’s NK terminology 
and apparatus, provide a clear statement: 
The value assumed by K is a key point with respect to the shape of a fitness landscape and, consequently, 
to its exploration. Indeed, for K = 0 the contribution of each element to overall fitness will be independent 
of every other element … The highly correlated structure of the fitness landscape [for K = 0] can be ef-
fectively exploited by local and incremental search processes. Conversely, as K increases, the landscape 
will be increasingly rugged and points that are close in the landscape will no longer have similar fitness 
values. What is most relevant to our point is the fact that the more rugged the landscape, the less (locally) 
informative is its exploration … 
The key idea, then, is that truly complex evaluative spaces are “rugged” in a sense which can 
defeat effective and efficient systematic search across those spaces. The difficulty is, to be 
specific, that there will be numerous “peaks” of overall value more or less randomly scattered 
over the (of course multi-dimensional) space and, especially as interdependencies increase, 
little to distinguish among them.2  
                                                 
2 It is important to note that our analysis presupposes that we have commensurated the standards. Difficulties 
searching a complex landscape are, of course, as I have pointed out and will reiterate, made more difficult when 
the landscape itself is constructed “as we go”, as, of course, it almost always is. The difficulties we are examin-
ing here, however, do not depend on this point. Even a fully constructed evaluative landscape will be difficult to 
search for the best option when that landscape is rugged. 
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Frenken (2006, p. 15) provides a useful summary of some of the key points about the geogra-
phy of complex evaluative landscapes:  
1. The number of local optima increases exponentially with complexity K. … 
2. The … higher the complexity of a system, the more randomly spread the local optima are in design 
space. 
3. … When K-values get larger, they pose increasingly more incompatible design constraints on the de-
sign, resulting in poorer performance of local optima (with expected fitness equal to 0.5 for complexity 
K approaching infinity). 
4. … 
5. The variance of fitness levels of local optima falls as complexity K increases. 
A complex evaluative space, then, has a large number of rather mediocre “local optima”, scat-
tered “randomly” across the space. The difficulties of “searching” such a space can now be 
exhibited by considering some search strategies. Any such strategy will have to identify (a) 
where the search begins, (b) how the search proceeds, and (c) what the “halting” routine is for 
this search. As is well known, two rather obvious search strategies each fail to satisfy impor-
tant meta-criteria when applied to complex NK landscapes. 
3. Searching Complex Evaluative Spaces 
One way of characterizing the difficulties raised by complex evaluative spaces is to contrast 
the relative advantages, as search strategies, of exhaustive and myopic (and, later, parallel) 
search across such spaces. (For exhaustive and myopic search, I adopt the terminology of 
Frenken, 2006.) 
For exhaustive search, the strategy is: (aE) begin the search at any randomly chosen point in 
the evaluative space; (bE) make any change or combination of technical changes to the object 
whose value in being considered and record the effect of that change on the overall (i.e. ser-
vice) value of the object; (cE) halt the search when all combinations of changes to the object 
have been surveyed and identify, as the optimum combination of technical characteristics, that 
combination whose associated overall value is a maximum in relation to all others. 
For myopic search, on the other hand, the strategy is: (aM) begin the search at any randomly 
chosen point in the evaluative space; (bM) make any single-trait technical change to the object 
whose value is being considered and consider whether this change raises, lowers, or fails to 
affect the overall (service) value, on this space, of this object; if the change increases the 
overall value of the object, proceed, iterating step (bM), from this point, otherwise from the 
original starting-point; (cM) halt the search when there is no change to the technical character-
istics of the object which does not lower the overall (service) value of the object. 
Exhaustive search should identify the global optimum even in a complex evaluative space. 3 
(Notice that we are presuming the existence and identity of a global optimum and, hence, of a 
completed project of commensuration.) It will require, however, that we search the entire 
space, which, when N and K are large, will itself be extremely large—for N = 10 and K = 9, 
the dimensionality of the search space is 109. This means that exhaustive search will be ex-
tremely resource intensive; it will require considerable time and creativity on the part of de-
                                                 
3 I will comment later (note 7 below) on a possibility that the attentive reader may have already noticed—
namely, that the permutations of technical changes may not exhaust those of the underlying standards against 
which overall “service” value is understood. 
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signers of the object whose value is being assessed … too much time and creativity, in many 
cases, for boundedly rational agents.4 
On the other hand, myopic search is more likely to “halt” in some reasonable time and hence 
be suitable for boundedly rational agents, but only because it is more likely to do so at the 
nearest local optimum from its starting-point, with the likelihood, tending asymptotically to 
certainty as K increases, that this local optimum is not the global optimum for the system as a 
whole. As Frenken says (2006, p. 14): 
[M]ost adaptive walks will end up in local optima with sub-optimal fitness. Myopic agents simply climb 
up the nearest hill without knowledge of other peaks with higher fitness. Only agents whose initial condi-
tions are, by chance, with the basin of attraction of a global optimum …, may end up in the global opti-
mum. … The … higher the complexity of a system and the larger the size of a system, the more likely 
agents are to become trapped in local optima. 
We have a (meta-level) trade-off, then, between these search strategies for complex evaluative 
spaces.5 As Frenken puts it (2006, p. 20): 
Although exhaustive search will always find the global optimum, yet to be fully certain to have the global 
optimum a designer requires 2N trials (the size of the entire design space). Exhaustive search is the most 
inefficient search strategy in terms of costs of search. By contrast, applying a search distance of 1 [as with 
the myopic strategy] runs the highest risk of ending up in a sub-optimum, yet is the most cost-efficient 
strategy. A trade-off exists between the effectiveness of search regarding the result in terms of the fitness 
of the solution and the efficiency of search in terms of the time required to reach this solution. 
III. Division of Labor 
Marengo and Dosi (2005, p. 309, emphasis added) provide a succinct and cogent formulation 
of an obvious possibility, given the analysis to this point. 
[A]s pointed out by Simon (1969), problem-solving by boundedly rational agents must necessarily pro-
ceed by decomposing any large, complex and intractable problem into smaller sub-problems which can 
be solved independently, i.e. by promoting what could be called the division of problem-solving labor.  
In other words, the mistake at the heart of both exhaustive and myopic search strategies has 
been to treat the search space as an indivisible whole. If the evaluative space is large and 
complexly structured and we simply attack it “head-on”, then, of course, a myopic search will 
be ineffective (fail reliably to identify the global optimum) and an exhaustive search will be 
inefficient (fail to identify the global optimum in a timely fashion). The lesson, clearly, as 
Simon already saw, is not to attack such a problem “head on”, but, rather, to divide it into 
parts, allocate the parts to teams, allow the teams to solve the resulting sub-problems, and 
then assemble the solutions discovered by these teams to provide an overall solution to the 
problem in question. (And this is, of course, the relevance, potentially, of these materials, to 
the issue left unaddressed by Kitcher, and by me in earlier work—the cognitive division of 
labor, e.g. in scientific communities.) 
There are, of course, problems which would readily yield to such an approach. They involve 
evaluative spaces which are “decomposable” in the specific sense (Frenken, 2006, p. 21) that 
                                                 
4 All the difficulties of search a pre-existing NK evaluative landscape are only compounded, of course, when we 
have to construct it as we go—develop variants on existing options and commensurate standards of evaluation 
which have not already been “priced out” with respect to one another.  
5 It is worth remarking, of course, that the key features of a rugged evaluative landscape—many mediocre local 
optima—might ground a case for Simonian “satisficing”. Why bother to expend resources in searching a space 
where a local peak is not likely to differ very much from any other local peak. Find a peak and stay there might 
be rather good advice. For an interesting discussion, see Frenken (2006, pp. 25ff). 
 From the organization to the division of cognitive labor 8 of 24 
they “can be partitioned into subsystems such that all epistatic relations [i.e. evaluative inter-
dependencies] are located within subsystems and not between subsystems.”6 
Where a system is decomposable, a parallel search strategy might be deployed as follows: 
(aP) for each independent subsystem, begin the search at any randomly chosen point in that 
portion of the evaluative space; (bP) make any single-trait “technical” change to the object 
whose value is being considered and consider whether this change raises, lowers, or fails to 
affect the overall value, on this space, of this object; if the change increases the overall value 
of the object, proceed, iterating step (bP) from this point, otherwise from the original starting-
point; (cP) halt the search when there is no change to the technical characteristics of the object 
which does not lower its overall (service) value; (dP) assemble the objects identified as em-
bodying local optima within each subsystem to constitute a globally optimum composite ob-
ject for the system as a whole. Each constituent object has been locally optimized against 
those standards which are relevant to its evaluation (and which are, by hypothesis, not rele-
vant to the evaluation of any other constituent object—this is what decomposability means). 
When combined, then, these objects constitute a composite which exhibits precisely the over-
all best balance of service characteristics. 
I have called this search strategy the parallel strategy because, of course, as Frenken points 
out (2006, p. 21), “decentralised teams can search independently and in parallel” in the vari-
ous subsystems into which the system as a whole has been divided—we need not, in other 
words, conduct the search serially, one subsystem at a time.7  
While such a parallel search strategy represents a considerable improvement in terms of effi-
ciency and effectiveness over the exhaustive and myopic strategies, it too is compromised—in 
its case, of course, by the relative rarity of genuinely decomposable systems of epistatically-
related evaluative standards. Here the graphical representations which figure so effectively in 
the analysis of Carliss Baldwin and Kim Clark (2000) will be helpful. Their example, as is 
evident, is of interdependency in design factors for a personal computer. (This representation 
could easily serve, I think, to capture some of the complexities in more familiar cognitive 
domains—e.g. scientific theorizing. One subsystem might be experimental techniques and 
results, another calculations linking theoretical variables with “observables”, etc. I return to 
this matter later.) 
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6 In this case, it is crucial, though I have not seen it commented on, that the very notion of a global optimum 
makes sense only in relation to the system as a whole and only as an option which is composite. I return to this 
point. 
7 Even relative to the qualifications I will review later, this approach encounters a potential difficulty which has 
not, to my knowledge, been discussed in the literature. The difficulty arises because or to the extent that the 
technically achievable sub-division of the object of enquiry maps properly onto the decomposition of the evalua-
tive space. The suggestion is that it cannot be guaranteed that the ways in which it is possible to decompose the 
object of enquiry will “line up” in the right sort of way with the ways in which it is possible to partition the val-
ues interdependencies. (I am not sure how this relates to what Saviotti (1996, p. 66) calls, according to Frenken 
(2006, p. 34), the “imaging pattern between technical and service characteristics”.) See note 3 above. 
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               ²  ² ² •    ²     T 
Packaging ²      ² ²       ²      • ²  ² ²   ² U 
 ² ²                  ² • ² ²  ² ²  V 
   ²       ²       ²   ² ² •  ²  ² ² W
        ²            ² ² ² • ²  ²  X 
         ² ² ²          ² ²  • ²  ² Y 
               ²     ²  ²  ² • ² ² Z 
                ² ²   ²   ²  ² •  aa 
                     ² ²  ² ² ² • bb 
In the chart above, which reproduces Baldwin and Clark’s Figure 2.5 (p. 50), ² represents a 
relationship of interdependency between the column characteristic and the row characteristic. 
So, for example, the variable A might be data-transfer rate. If B were bundle size for data 
transfer, then the ² in cell AB indicates that transfer rates and bundle size are interdependent 
… and the ²s in other cells in column A and row B indicate the presence of still other rela-
tionships of interdependency.   
What such a diagram illustrates is that, while interdependencies might “cluster” around cer-
tain component subsystems within a larger integrated system, there will nevertheless often be, 
as there are in this case, what we might call “residual” interdependencies which will (or ought 
to) affect the design of these component subsystems. As Baldwin and Clark put it (2000, p. 
50): 
In fact, there is no way [in their example] to divide the overall design into independent [strictly “decom-
posable”] subdesigns. If by some chance the drive system, say, were designed independently of the main 
board, the matrix indicates that there are twenty-seven ways that the resulting designs might be in conflict 
(27 out-of-block ²s). Any one of these dependencies, if unaddressed, could lead to the catastrophic fail-
ure of the whole design … 
In other words, the parallel search strategy outlined above, if run on the four subsystems iden-
tified in the diagram, could not be guaranteed, as it could be in a fully decomposable system, 
to deliver the global optimum. It cannot be guaranteed, in other words, that a composite object 
formed from four subsystems which were optimised locally would itself be either technically 
feasible or globally optimal in its service characteristics. As Marengo and Dosi put it (2005, p. 
309): 
[T]he extent of the division of problem-solving labor is limited by the existence of interdependencies. If 
sub-problem decomposition separates interdependent elements, then solving each sub-problem independ-
ently does not allow overall optimization. 
Optimization within one of the component subsystems, treated independently of the others, 
might fix one or more parameters in ways that, because of the inter-componential interde-
pendencies, were not compatible with optimization either of other components or of the sys-
tem as a whole. Once again, Marengo and Dosi (2005, p. 310) provide an insightful formula-
tion: 
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[I]nterdependencies undermine the effectiveness of the selection process as a device for adaptive optimi-
zation and introduce forms of path-dependency with lock-in into sub-optimal states which does not origi-
nates from the frictions and costs connected to the working of the selection mechanism, but from the in-
ternal structure of the entities undergoing selection. 
This will, perhaps, bear some explication. Suppose that, in considering how to optimize the 
value of the Drive System (DS), we were to make a particular design decision, about, say, 
how to optimize with respect the parameter B. Such a decision will of course impact on, and 
we would not reach it without considering its impact, in relation to overall value, on the deci-
sions available to us on other specifically DS-relevant design parameters. Suppose, then, that 
we have made precisely that decision affecting the value of B that does indeed optimize, 
overall, the performance of the Drive System considered as an “independent” subsystem. (No-
tice, again, that I am presupposing that these service characteristics have already been com-
mensurated, and that the relation between technical and service characteristics is well under-
stood.) Notwithstanding such “locally global optimization”, we have ipso facto fixed or at 
least constrained the variation in relation to other design decisions that affect other parts of 
the system as a whole (and, accordingly, the overall value of the system as a whole), precisely 
because, of course, decisions affecting B are interdependent with other decisions in other 
component subsystems. For example, making a decision about technical characteristics that 
fixes B fixes or at least constrains decisions about the parameter H, which is relevant to the 
performance of the Main Board (MB). 
Another way of putting this brings out the difficulty for this sort of division of labor. If the 
Drive System team optimizes locally it will fix the value of B in a certain way. If the Main 
Board team optimizes locally it will fix the value of H in a certain way. Since these parame-
ters are in fact interdependent, it cannot be guaranteed, and in some cases will not happen, 
that decision which fixes the value of B will be compatible with that which fixes the value of 
H. Sometimes this will mean that the composite design is not actually technically feasible—
the decision we make affecting B means that we cannot physically assemble the Drive System 
and the Main Board into a working unit given the separate decision we have made affecting 
H—there is technical incompatibility, we might say. Sometimes, however, even if there is no 
such brute incompatibility, there may well be sub-optimality. Because we have fixed B and H 
in the ways we have, we cannot explore the entire evaluative space and, hence, cannot be cer-
tain to have encountered exactly that combination of technical features which does optimize 
the service characteristics of the composite object.  
Indeed, this second possibility is what Marengo and Dosi mean when they refer to “path-
dependency”. A choice affecting B affects other choices and may result in what they call 
“lock-in”—we are locked into choices, for example, about H (and hence about the perform-
ance of another subsystem) by whatever choices we might already have made affecting a pa-
rameter relevant to the performance of the Drive System. Whatever solution we arrive at to 
the problem of overall optimization is therefore dependent on the specifics of the path we 
have taken to arrive at that decision. If we decide on matters affecting B first, then we lock in 
a decision about H and, accordingly, about what sub-space of the total evaluative space we 
can explore in search of an overall optimum. If, on the other hand, we decide on matters af-
fecting H first, then we may well restrict the range of technical choices affecting B that we 
can make. In this case, we may follow quite a different path in search of some global opti-
mum. In either case, where we arrive is dependent on the order in which we make various de-
cisions about where and how to seek value. (This is surprising only relative to equilibrium 
models where solutions are path-independent.)  
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Baldwin and Clark provide a clear statement (2000, p. 50) of one implication of path-
dependency in relation to global optimization.8  
Unintended, possibly dire consequences arise when innate interdependencies in the design are not ad-
dressed in the task structure of the design process. … In cases like this designers must cycle and iterate 
through the tasks, searching for a combination of parameters that “works.” Such cycles are extremely 
common in design processes. Christopher Alexander describes them in his classic work on design theory, 
Notes of the Synthesis of Form: 
It is a common experience that attempts to solve just one piece of a problem first, then others, and 
so on, lead to endless involutions. You no sooner solve one aspect of a thing, than another point is 
out of point. And when you correct that one, something else goes wrong. You go round and round in 
circles, unable to produce a form that is thoroughly right. 
If parallel search results in “lock-in”, then cycling is one response. Make a design decision 
which fixes B and then see what happens to H. If what happens to H is too “dire”, then recon-
sider how B has been fixed. If some combination of technical characteristics affecting both B 
and H seems acceptable, then consider the impact of “locking in” this combination on other 
epistatically related variables. If impact is too “dire” in relation, say, to U (which is two-steps 
interdependent with B), then reconsider the decision about B/H. And so on. Again, there are 
difficulties from the point of view of effective and efficient division of labor. As Raghu et al. 
point out, in the presence of dense interdependencies, the genuine independence of teams 
working on subproblems is highly compromised. They say (2003, p. 2): 
In organizational and social systems – perhaps in mechanical ones as well – it is possible to think of in-
terdependency and interaction among the parts as a matter of information transmission or communication. 
Consider, with Eric von Hippel (1990), the problem of organizing product innovation. Here, the issue is 
how to decompose the organization of a research and development process by partitioning tasks among 
development teams. As von Hippel pointed out, in order to solve this decomposition problem, one has to 
focus on the interdependencies among the various tasks the project comprises. If the project is organized 
in a non-decomposable manner, then interdependency will be high, meaning that each development team 
will need constantly to receive and use information about what all the other development teams are doing. 
Obviously, when the system of interdependencies is “complex”, such cycling in search of “a 
combination of parameters that ‘works’” is, potentially, exhaustingly iterative. This is not, of 
course, a happy conclusion to reach. Indeed, we know, experimentally, that this sort of cy-
cling can be very debilitating, psychically and otherwise, for workers engaged with these sorts 
of systems. As Terry Connolly and Ken Koput put it (2002, p. 288): 
These [experimental] demonstrations present subjects with environments in which hidden variables are 
strongly coupled, important patterns build slowly, responses are delayed, and feedback loops are per-
verse—probably realistic representations of real-world complexity, but cognitively overwhelming. 
Dorner, for example, reports such dysfunctional behaviors as excessive focus on a single problem and/or 
sequential problem hopping; failure to cope with slow systems response or long-term trends (“last-period 
focus”); and response rigidity in the face of deteriorating system performance. … Highly dynamic, com-
plexly looped environments are certainly difficult to understand and operate. 
In the face of these difficulties, we seem to be led back, by cycling, in the direction of exhaus-
tive search strategies—already rejected, for complex systems, as too resource intensive rela-
tive to our finite powers and resources, and certainly, in view of these demands, no less likely 
than cycling to induce adverse reactions. 
Summarizing, we might say, then, that, for highly complex evaluative spaces, myopic search 
is not reliably effective, exhaustive search is likely to be inefficient, and parallel search is 
                                                 
8 Readers familiar with social choice theory will hear the resonance of this description with the “cycling” that 
can arise in situations where multiple points of view need to be reconciled with one another to identify a socially 
best choice. Cp. Mueller, 1989. 
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likely to be inconclusive, in the sense that there is no natural “equilibrium” into which it can 
rightly settle. Graphically we have, if you will, a meta-cycle. 
FIGURE 2 
 
IV. Modularity, Paradigms, and Markets 
All this is, if you will, stage-setting in relation to the idea, very influential in design and man-
agement circles, of modularity. (See in particular, Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004; Raghu et al., 2003; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996.) Of course, in introducing 
this idea, I do not want it to be thought that I am offering it, or indeed that any of the propo-
nents of this idea are offering it, as a definitive solution to the problem which we have 
sketched, and which is summarized in Figure 2 above. Modularity, if you will, is a way of ad-
dressing the trade-offs between effectiveness, efficiency, and conclusiveness; it is not a way 
of obviating the need to make exactly these trade-offs. 
I will begin by presenting what is, in the management science and design science literatures, a 
standard account of modularity. The idea of an interface is, I think, the key feature of this 
standard account. I will later contrast this idea with the idea, from Kuhn’s work, of the para-
digm. We will see, I think, that these ideas imply quite different approaches to the cognitive 
division of labor as mediated by modules (making up a larger whole). We will arrive, in due 
course, at the “marketplace of ideas”, giving that cliché a specifically Kuhnian twist. At that 
point we will also return to the more familiar domain of scientific and other disciplined forms 
of cognitive enquiry. 
1. Modularity 
We can hardly do better than begin with Ron Sanchez and Joseph Mahoney’s influential 
work. According to them (1996, p. 65), “Modularity is a special form of design which inten-
tionally creates a high degree of independence or ‘loose coupling’ between component de-
signs by standardizing component interface specifications.” (Cp. Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004, 
p. 161 and Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 14.) 
This will bear some explication. As we have seen, the attempt to allocate incompletely de-
composed subsystems to separate teams is threatened by the possibility (rising to a certainty 
when interdependencies are “dense”) that there will be cross-component as well as intra-
component interdependencies and, accordingly, that there will either be mismatches between 
the work of teams or the need for extensive, ad hoc and iterative communication between 
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One solution to this problem is to “modularize”, where this encompasses several tasks.  
First of all, we try to so divide tasks as to minimize the impact of any remaining cross-
component interdependencies. This might involve minimizing the number of cross-
component interdependencies, but it might also involve considering the relative strengths of 
the various interdependencies which we have identified. For example, if one evaluative pa-
rameter has a very marked effect on another, then, other things being equal, this would be a 
reason for including both within a single component.9 Another factor we might consider is, of 
course, the degree to which interdependencies “cascade”, as I put it earlier. For example, if 
parameter B influences parameter H which, in turn, influences parameter U, then, depending 
on how rapidly the influence “decays”, we might want, ceteris paribus, to include B, H, and 
U within a single subsystem. 
Secondly, and crucially, for those cross-component interdependencies which remain after par-
titioning, we create an interface which consists, in effect, of an assignment of parameters in 
such a way to ensure consistency when the components are brought together. So, for example, 
I considered, earlier, how independent design of the Drive System and Main Board might 
come unstuck given the interdependency of those design parameters affecting the values B 
and H. If we are modularizing the larger system, we will, then, simply have to make design 
decisions—which, by implication, fix values for B and H—so that the resulting subsystems 
will prove to be compatible, whatever other decisions are made affecting parameters within 
these subsystems. Such an allocation is what Baldwin and Clark (2000) call a design rule. The 
subsequent work, on DS and MB subsystems, by the teams allocated those tasks, is subject to 
this rule and, accordingly, can be expected, other things being equal, to produce, at least in 
this respect, subsystem designs or solutions which are compatible with one another, at least in 
the sense that they are technically feasible.10 A design rule therefore implicitly defines what 
Brian Loasby would recognize (1976, pp. 77f) as “[a]n organisation chart … [which] specifies 
what interdependencies should not be taken into account”. 
The advantages of modularization are obvious enough. The evaluative space within any given 
module is orders of magnitude less complex than the space for the system as a whole. It is a 
sub-set of the total evaluative space and, where there would be cross-component interdepend-
encies, these have been eliminated by the imposition of design rules which fix the values of 
interdependent parameters. Accordingly, a search strategy which “halts” within a reasonable 
period of time need not always be myopic and, where it isn’t, can discover, with reasonable 
effort, an optimum for each subsystem. Even myopic searches on such a sub-space are more 
likely to discover an optimum, given the lower evaluative dimensionality of the space. Fur-
thermore, because of the interface created by the design rules, within-module searches will 
yield subsystem solutions that are compatible with one another and whose “fit” with one an-
other does not need to be negotiated between teams on an ad hoc (and time consuming) basis. 
                                                 
9 It is not a trivial matter to partition a system into subsystems. I consider this issue later. It is also appropriate to 
recall my earlier discussion of the potential mismatch between feasible partitions of the technical characteristics 
of the object of enquiry and partitions of the service characteristics by which that object is to be judged. See 
notes 3 and 7 above. Especially when the evaluative space is constructed “as we go”, enquirers are not working 
directly with service, but rather, with technical characteristics. Any sensible partitioning of the task is probably 
therefore going to be made on a technical basis. 
10 I have adopted a way of describing these decisions and the design rules to which they lead, despite the way in 
which they are commonly portrayed, as decisions which enforce partitions on technical characteristics, rather 
than service characteristics. This only adds to my anxieties about the potential for a mismatch. There is no reason 
to believe, a priori, that technically feasible subdivisions will track evaluatively modular partitions. 
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Finally, all “cycling” will occur only in the relatively small sub-spaces defined by the various 
modules, giving a higher degree of conclusiveness. 
On the other hand, there are down-side risks to modularization. (Of course, they are simply an 
internalization, if you will, of the risks already identified when the evaluative space is com-
plex and undivided.) As Baldwin and Clark themselves point out (2000, pp. 68-9): 
On the minus side, designers will lose the ability to explore some parts of the space of designs—in effect, 
the architects will restrict the search, declaring some parts of the design space to be out of bounds. If 
those areas have already been explored and are known to have no “high peaks of value,” then the cost of 
limiting the designers’ search in this way will be low. But if the areas have not been explored and do con-
tain “high peaks,” then those superior designs will not be discovered, and the cost of imposing the design 
rule will be high. 
We limit cycling and incompatibilities by taking design decisions which fix certain evaluative 
parameters that would otherwise exhibit interdependencies. (There is no need to fix them if 
they don’t exhibit interdependencies!) But fixing these parameters means that we cannot ex-
plore their relations with one another and, hence, cannot be sure that we have “tuned” them to 
achieve an overall best outcome for the system as a whole. It might well be, for example, that 
the values of B and H that we have imposed, in devising a design rule that enables us to iso-
late the work of the Drive System team from that of the Main Board team, are not that combi-
nation of B and H values that in fact would lead to an overall best design for the computer as 
a whole. But, of course, we can only tune these values to such a global optimum by engaging 
in an exhaustive search of the entire evaluative space, which, as we have already agreed, is 
typically inefficient and, indeed, impossible “in real time”. (Notice that these downside risks 
are absent in the case of genuinely decomposable systems.) 
All this means, of course, that modularization imposes path-dependency. The optimum that is 
discovered by exploring a modularized evaluative space is the optimum that you can reach, in 
other words, along paths in part defined by and hence relative to the design rules which create 
the interfaces between subsystems. If we had made different choices about the design rules, 
different optima would have become accessible to search. And since we haven’t, by hypothe-
sis, made an exhaustive search of the evaluative space as a whole, we cannot be sure, antece-
dently, that we have chosen exactly those values for the parameters covered by our design 
rules that would lead us along or at least make accessible to us the pathways leading to a 
global optimum for the system as a whole. (Another way of putting this is to say that, in a 
modularized system, as opposed to a decomposable system, it cannot be guaranteed that the 
globally optimum system is what you get when you put together the locally optimized subsys-
tems.) 
Actually, the difficulties are greater still. Although I have occasionally qualified my account 
by pointing to the constructed rather than given nature of the evaluative space (and, of course, 
of the options we use that space to assess), I have nevertheless mostly followed the common-
place diction of management science and design theory in describing the issues before us. It is 
time to bring these provisos to the fore. In this regard, the work of Daniel Levinthal is espe-
cially helpful. As he points out (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004, p. 162, emphasis added):  
Not only are systems not fully decomposable, but also apt partitions that capture the nearly decomposa-
ble structure of complex systems are not self-evident. Designers are searching on the matrix of design pa-
rameters at four levels: (1) the “appropriate” number of modules; (2) the “appropriate” mapping of design 
elements to the modules; (3) the “appropriate” interactions among the design elements within each mod-
ule; and (4) the “appropriate” interfaces or interactions between modules. 
In other words, in the absence of an exhaustive search over a space that we would, in many 
cases, be constructing as we went, we cannot tell how to partition the evaluative space as a 
whole in the best way. The clustering of interdependencies that enabled us, in the diagram 
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borrowed from Baldwin and Clark, to partition the system as a whole into four relatively in-
dependent modules was not given but itself had to be discovered, initially in unfamiliar sys-
tems, by trial and error, by a process of commensuration or, indeed, by a process preliminary 
to commensuration properly speaking. The loci of interdependency; the strength of interde-
pendencies—these are matters that have to be discovered, often by the constructive explora-
tion of an evaluative space of high dimensionality. Since, as we have established, such a 
search will be incomplete and haphazard in complex evaluative landscapes, any modulariza-
tion is apt to be based, in varying degrees, on guesswork rather than established facts about 
these interdependencies and, hence, about how the total system should be modularized. (After 
all, if we knew the system well enough to know how to modularize, we might well have dis-
covered, already, the global optimum and thus have no need to modularize and search!) And, 
as Baldwin and Clark point out (2000, p. 70), “[i]mposing a design rule when one is ignorant 
of the true underlying interdependencies can lead to design failure”. Absent exhaustive (con-
structive) search, we may even fail to see that an attempted modularization did not manage to 
control for cross-module “technical” (let alone evaluative) interdependencies and, accord-
ingly, our teams of workers may produce subsystem solutions which are not compatible with 
one another even though they conform to the design rules we have imposed.  
In modelling precisely this risk, Levinthal has discovered, ironically, that highly modularized 
systems are more rather than less likely to exhibit such incompatibilities. As he put it (Ethiraj 
and Levinthal, 2004, pp. 169-70): 
[C]onsistent with prior work (Marengo et al. 2000), the effectiveness of innovation is lower, or even dis-
ruptive, the greater the deviation of the design structure from the true underlying structure. Second, and 
more surprising, we find that, in the long run, erring on the side of greater integration poses lower per-
formance penalties than erring on the side of greater modularity. 
The first of these points is obvious enough. The less accurate our assessment of the interde-
pendencies which actually exist (what they are and how strong they are), the more likely the 
failure of any modularization of this system that we construct on the basis of this assessment. 
The second point is even more intriguing. In the absence of the kind of knowledge produced 
only by an exhaustive search that we will not (and perhaps could not) have carried out, a good 
heuristic principle for modularization is “err on the side of less rather than more modulariza-
tion”, or more concretely “have fewer rather than more subsystems (and hence independently 
functioning teams of workers)”. Of course, with fewer modules, the evaluative dimensionality 
of the subsystems remains relatively high and, accordingly, myopic search strategies may not 
discover global optima even within these subsystems (and exhaustive searches within these 
larger subsystems will continue to be costly). 
One is tempted to say that we are going round in circles. 




It is a striking feature of modularization, as a response to complexity, that it works by making 
and enforcing precise decisions affecting specific evaluative variables. Each design rule allo-
cates specific values to the various characteristics which it encompasses and the partition of 
the space which these design rules mediate is itself a precise division of that space into sub-
systems. Another important basis for division of labor—the idea of a paradigm (more or less 
in Kuhn’s canonical sense)—works rather differently. 
The first thing to note, to preclude confusion, is that the paradigm idea is in fact current 
within the management science literature, having been introduced by Giovanni Dosi in his 
1982 paper, which drew heavily on Imre Lakatos’ (1970) methodology of scientific research 
programs, especially in relation to the ideas of hard core, positive and negative heuristics, and 
the like. While I too am going to be drawing on Kuhn and Lakatos (and also Peter Galison), I 
am going, unlike Dosi, to be articulating something about the Kuhn/Lakatos model that has 
not, in my view, been sufficiently emphasized. Ironically, my analysis will lead us back to our 
starting point in Kitcher’s observations about the diversity of evaluative perspectives and, ac-
cordingly, to a market or something like it. 
Perhaps more explicitly than Lakatos, Kuhn asserted the plurality of evaluative standards 
relevant to the assessment of scientific theories. He said (1977, p. 322): 
These five characteristics—accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness—are all standard 
criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a theory. … Nevertheless, two sorts of difficulties are regularly en-
countered by the men who must use these criteria in choosing … [between rival theories]. Individually, 
the criteria are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ about their application to concrete cases. In 
addition, when deployed together, they repeatedly prove to conflict with one another; accuracy may, for 
example, dictate the choice of one theory, scope the choice of another.  
He continues (1977, p. 324): 
When scientists must choose between competing theories, two men fully committed to the same list of 
criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions. Perhaps they interpret simplicity differ-
ently or have different convictions about the range of fields within which the consistency criterion must 
be met. Or perhaps they agree about these matters but differ about the relative weights to be accorded to 
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Perhaps more explicitly than Kuhn (though still suggestively rather than thoroughly), Lakatos 
sketched the modular structure of specifically scientific, but, by implication, all disciplined, 
enquiry. In particular, Lakatos showed, both analytically and through examples, that individ-
ual enquirers or distinct teams might work, under the banner of a single research program, on 
quite different aspects of that program’s agenda for enquiry. (Here I begin to read Lakatos 
through Galison (1998), not that Galison himself refers to Lakatos.)  
The “hard core” of a research program consists of that system of theoretical, even in some 
cases formally metaphysical, models to which practitioners remain committed in their enquir-
ies. Often the hard core will take the form of a model of an empirical situation. And, typically, 
models are both abstract in relation to the concrete realities they are to be applied to and im-
mature, especially at the start of enquiry, in the sense that they will both bear and benefit from 
further development. I like the word “articulation” to describe the two, distinct ways in which 
the hard core of a research program might be developed by its practitioners. (Frenken (2006, 
pp. 63f) uses the term “design family” to refer to very similar phenomena.) 
On the one hand, more empirically minded practitioners will attempt to articulate the abstract 
model to the concrete realities it is meant to be applied to. This may involve them in experi-
mentation or even in the development of instrumentation that is, in turn, a prerequisite for ef-
fective experimentation. In some cases, this work of articulation will be guided by an already 
sketched-out “positive heuristic” which might, especially by analogy with better understood 
systems, set out an agenda for bringing the theoretical into closer contact with the experimen-
tally accessible. Work in this vein might involve the development of “auxiliary hypotheses” 
which function as linking steps in derivations which begin with the mathematical manipula-
tion of an abstract model and end with predictions that could be confirmed or refuted by ex-
perimental “readings”, e.g. of meters registering quantities of theory-relevant variables. 
On the other hand, more theoretically minded practitioners will attempt to articulate the ab-
stract theory by developing it in its own terms. Lakatos gives examples of Newton’s work on 
planetary motions and Bohr’s on the atomic spectrum. In both cases, instinct in the model it-
self was a natural trajectory of theoretical elaboration of more and more detailed and theory 
more “realistic” models of the objects of enquiry.  
Here, then, is one simple division of labor—broadly between the theorist and the experi-
menter (and, I might add, with a nod to Galison, the specialist in instrumentation), and, more 
specifically, among those enquirers who have responsibility, for example, for specific deriva-
tional steps connecting the theoretical hard core, via the positive heuristic, with empirically 
testable predictions.  
There is, then, an implicit division of the technical dimensions of the “problem space” in such 
cases. I have already mentioned Saviotti’s distinction between technical and service character-
istics of an object of evaluation. For concrete objects, the technical characteristics might well 
include physically separable component parts, but will certainly include manipulable features 
of the object in itself—e.g. its size, the chemical and physical characteristics of the materials 
it is made of, etc. In a similar way, any program of enquiry will have certain technical charac-
teristics in this sense. A theory might have parameters, identifying the variables hypothesised 
as of relevance to explaining or predicting the phenomena which the theory is a theory about. 
Changing the values of these parameters might change the service characteristics of the the-
ory—e.g. its accuracy, scope of application, etc. In some cases, we can partition the theory, as 
a system of interdependent technical elements, into modules which could then be worked on 
by different enquirers or teams; the auxiliary hypotheses that are developed to articulate the 
theory to the data can be treated separately from the theory per se and its elaboration through 
mathematical modelling and the like.  
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In some cases, then, we can modularize the research program, allocating to different teams of 
enquirers different kinds of tasks. Certainly, there is evidence that many scientific (and, in-
deed, a great many other) forms of enquiry have been modularized in this way. Anyone in-
volved in even the most informally constituted research team will have some sense of the 
various ways in which such modularization might work. (Cp. e.g. Knorr Cetina, 1999.) 
Of course, we can expect the same sorts of issues to arise with the modularization of enquiry 
as are already well understood from the theoretical work I have been surveying here. There 
will be path dependency and, indeed, the risk of incompatibilities between independently de-
veloped components of the larger project. As Peter Galison puts it (1998, p. 132): 
The criteria that divided the practitioners of theory, experiment, and instrumentation—different meetings, 
different preprint exchanges, different journals—were the classic sociological dividers Kuhn (and many 
others since) productively invoked to identify distinct communities. Moreover, the experimenters and 
theorists often disagreed as to what entities there were, how they were classified, and how one demon-
strated their existence—just the criteria Kuhn used to identify incommensurable systems of belief. With 
distinct communities and incommensurable beliefs, the layers seem to fall apart like decaying plywood; if 
they are significantly disconnected … then the continuity of one level would hardly bolster discontinuity 
at another. 
More importantly, perhaps, we won’t, typically, have any better idea in, say, the scientific 
context than in other, say technological design, contexts, how to partition the total problem 
space. And, as already noted, this is a serious matter. Since the very point of much enquiry is 
precisely to discover the way in which the phenomena are partitioned, we cannot imagine, 
perhaps even less so than in the case of technologies built on already established scientific 
bases, that we will be able to partition the problem space effectively.  
3. The Marketplace of Ideas 
Here is where the idea of diversity which Kitcher focused on becomes relevant again, though 
not in precisely the way that Kitcher himself had in mind. When we need, to cope with com-
plexity, to partition the problem space … and when, inevitably, we do not know how to divide 
the space and allocate the labor, what we should do if we are able (and should try to set the 
conditions for if we currently are not able) is, as Marengo et al. put it (2000, p. 777), set up 
“populations of agents … that compete on the basis of search strategies based on [distinctive] 
conjectural decompositions.” (In my 2003 book, pp. 137f, I described what was, in effect, a 
“federalist” model for enquiry of a similar kind.) What we should do, in other words, is create 
or nurture a social situation in which different individuals and teams differently interpret the 
deliverances of the research program. This will mean, in effect, that we will have a collection 
of differently implemented search strategies over the same underlying objective problem 
space (if, again, it makes sense to posit such a space). Each distinctive strategy will divide the 
space differently and perhaps even search it differently. (It may even define it differently.) 
For example, insofar as different enquirers put different relative weights on the various 
evaluative standards they might make different moves from the same starting-point. Someone 
who thinks a theory’s accuracy is more important than its scope might tweak its parameters in 
a different way, in attempting to improve it, than someone who assigns more significance to 
scope than to accuracy. As Brian Loasby put it (2000, p. 722), “there is no unique way of 
framing any problem, nor any unique way of operating within any imperfectly specified 
framework”. Such a population of distinctive enquirers will be less hostage to potentially mis-
taken partitioning of the problem space. And to the degree that they also differ in the ways in 
which they construct interfaces between (and design rules governing) modules within the lar-
ger system, they will be less hostage too to lock-in and path-dependencies. Or, at least, they 
will, collectively, be less hostage to lock-in. Individually, of course, each will be, at least pro 
tem, locked into her own favored search strategy and to the paths it puts her on.  
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As Kuhn himself says (1970, p. 186), and as both Kitcher and I have tried to show, “individ-
ual variability in the application of shared values may serve functions essential to” rational 
enquiry. In particular, individual variability in (constructively) partitioning and exploring the 
multi-dimensional problem spaces by which rational enquiry is typically characterized offer a 
better response to boundedness and complexity than does a simple division of that problem 
space. We need both division and diversity to pursue enquiry in complex situations. We need, 
if you like, a marketplace consisting of a collection of different “fora” in which problems are 
analysed and dissected. (Cp. Elster, 1986.) And sometimes, of course, this combination of di-
versity and division of labor will enable us to identify a global optimum. One of the teams 
will adopt a system of modularization and search that enables them to identify an option (ob-
ject, problem-solution, etc.) that is best overall and can be recognized as such.11  
Notice, furthermore, how this approach differs from the interface/design rules approach we 
considered earlier. That approach works by defining interfaces in terms which are fixed for 
all—the various teams can work separately and then bring their products together to form a 
coherent composite precisely because the design rules specify precise and fixed values for key 
(interdependent) parameters. The more Kuhnian approach of Marengo et al. works by prolif-
erating competing design rules in which values are fixed “locally” but vary from one “design 
team” to another. (There are features of the paradigm or research program which facilitate 
this—e.g. the abstractness or interpretability of the paradigm and hence its multiple interpret-
ability. Cp. my 2005a.) 
None of this is to deny, of course, the persistence, indeed the ineliminability, even when we 
deploy both diversity and division, of many of the issues which we have canvassed.  
One important proviso is that the multiplication of different interpretations of some common 
paradigm may obviate or at least does not obviously facilitate the “increasing returns” (Ar-
thur, 1994) that may be available when individuals pursuing a common project produce what 
Garud Raghu et al. (2003, p. 4) call “[n]etwork effects [which] occur when the value to an 
individual of adopting [an approach] depends on the number of others who have already 
adopted it or who can be expected eventually to adopt it.” As they explain, “[t]hese network 
effects generate positive feedback. As a result, a single standard is likely to win out and be-
come dominant under most circumstances.” And this is, indeed, precisely the sort of domi-
nance that Kuhn recognized in his account of “normal science”, guided by a common para-
digm. It is, in fact, an interesting matter, on which I have commented elsewhere (2005a), to 
reconcile the multiplication of different interpretations with the dominance of the single para-
digm. The reconciliation is mediated, of course, by what I have earlier referred to as the shal-
lowness of the consensus which individuals have about the paradigm which provides their 
common frame of reference. Notwithstanding these complexities, there is nevertheless a per-
sistent trade-off, if you will, between the advantages in searching a complex evaluative space 
which we obtain by diversifying the search strategies and the disadvantages in colonizing 
such a terrain that result, precisely, from the foregone network effects. 
More importantly, perhaps, and certainly more strikingly, Marengo et al. (2000, pp. 779-80) 
sound a cautionary note, based on their own simulation studies: 
[I]t is remarkable that correct decomposition strategies [even when represented in the population of com-
peting teams of enquirers] might not always prevail when nested in competitive environments character-
                                                 
11 I don’t here insist on another kind of diversity—e.g. the kind Kuhn wrote of where, because of differences in 
weighting contributory evaluative standards, different teams might have a different sense of what was needed to 
be “best overall”. Perhaps, as I suggested earlier, there is unanimity among the teams only when an option is 
“dominant” in the sense that I recommended, earlier and elsewhere. 
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ized by some form of selection. In fact, while they are able always to locate the global optimum with cer-
tainty, the time required might be so long that they are actually eliminated by the selection mechanism. 
This is, as Marengo et al. rightly state, a remarkable, and a chastening, result. In the face of 
complexity—and that, surely, is our condition in most domains of enquiry—and given our 
boundedness, we cannot be sure, even when we happen to hit on the right way of approaching 
a particular problem, that the right way will indeed prevail in competition with other less 
meritorious ways. In particular, it may not, or not reliably, do so when searches mediated by 
the correct approach take longer to find the global optimum than less correct approaches do to 
find local optima that are at least temporarily “good enough” to prevail in a competitive con-
text involving the “network effects” which I mentioned earlier. 
In short, while adding diversity to division enhances our prospects for understanding the 
world, it does not and cannot guarantee that what we understand is actually what it is right to 
understand. Here again there is a form of path dependency, I believe. Here the path is traced 
by the history of the competition between teams of enquirers (rather than, as previously, by 
the history of each team’s search of the space of enquiry). After all, approaches to partitioning 
and searching which would lead to “the truth” if persisted with may not be competitive, in re-
lation to other, objectively inferior approaches, at every stage of their elaboration. They may 
therefore be eliminated if unlucky enough to encounter other approaches which are, even if 
only temporarily, superior to them in whatever ways are relevant to the selection process. 
What the simulations of Marengo et al. seem to show is, in effect, that we are stuck with his-
tory, or, as Dosi puts it (1997, p. 1531), “the explanation of why something [such as a theory] 
exists rests on how it became what it is”. There is, in effect, no equilibrium explanation for 
what we have come to understand in many domains—no explanation that says, in effect, that, 
wherever you started from, you were in the basin of attraction of the truth and you were, un-
avoidably, sucked upwards towards it. Sometimes, indeed, we will, even in the marketplace of 
ideas, be sucked upwards towards understandings of the world that are meritorious without 
being optimal. As Marengo et al. (2000, p. 757) put it: “Suboptimality and path-dependence 
are … ubiquitous features of … problem-solving.” C’est la vie! (Get over it!) 
I mentioned, earlier, that, on the kinds of pluralist models I have been working with, we could 
generate the diversity needed to facilitate risk-spreading without invoking “sordid” motives, 
as seems to be necessary on Kitcher’s approach. I think we can now also see that such mo-
tives are unnecessary in accounting for what Pierre Bourdieu (1998, p. 39) calls the “social 
arbitrariness” of “the scientific field”. The knowledge generated and evaluated within any 
complex field of enquiry will unavoidably be “arbitrary” at least in the sense that its devel-
opment is a path-dependent one. But there needn’t, as Bourdieu seems, unlike Kitcher, to ac-
knowledge, be anything “sordid” about this. The unavoidable arbitrariness of course creates, 
in effect, a field of possibilities in which “sordid” motives might function, but the arbitrariness 
is inherent in this field per se; it does not arise because or only to the extent that “sordid” mo-
tives are actually in play. Even the saints and heroes of enquiry are going to generate socially 
arbitrary, or rather epistemically arbitrary outcomes. There is no alternative. (I repeat: Get 
over it!) 
Of those who may have thought otherwise, perhaps the most articulate was Michael Polanyi 
who, in his writings on science, specifically posited a kind of “hidden hand” mechanism that 
we might associate with the equilibrium approach to explaining and legitimating a division of 
cognitive labor. He said (1962, p. 55): 
[S]elf-coordination of independent initiatives leads to a joint result which is unpremeditated by any of 
those who bring it about. Their coordination is guided by “an invisible hand” towards the joint discovery 
of a hidden system of things. Since its end-result is unknown, this kind of cooperation can only advance 
in stages, and the total performance will be the best possible if each consecutive step is decided upon by 
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someone most competent to do so. We may imagine this condition to be fulfilled for the fitting together 
of a jig-saw puzzle if each helper watches out for any new opportunities arising along a particular section 
of the so far completed patch of the puzzle, and also keeps an eye on a particular lot of pieces, so as to fit 
them in wherever a change presents itself. … We may affirm that the pursuit of science by independent 
self-coordinated initiatives assures the most efficient possible organization of scientific progress. 
Actually, there is some ambiguity here and I should be careful in my reading of Polanyi. 
Strictly speaking, Polanyi mentions “a hidden order of things”, rather than, as might imply 
infallibility in the “hidden hand”, “the hidden order of things”. Likewise, he claims that the 
kinds of mechanisms we are considering a “the most efficient possible organization of scien-
tific progress”, not, again, that they are infallible in uncovering “the hidden order of things”. 
Certainly, there is nothing in the results I’ve reported that would contradict his efficiency 
claim. The combination of diversity and division of labor may well be more efficient than 
other approaches in “generating a progressive sequence of consensus practices”. But that is a 
matter for another occasion and, in any event, even “the most efficient” mechanism will, it 
now seems clear, be a fallible, path-dependent one. 
V. Concluding Reflections 
I have, at various points, mentioned, and stressed the significance of, the possibility that both 
the objects of evaluation and the standards by which they are assessed might be “made up as 
we go”. The diction of management science discussions of division of labor and complexity 
has a tendency to obscure this possibility. This is understandable given the models which are 
used to facilitate rigorous discussion. You can’t simulate searches of a multidimensional 
epistatically structured evaluation space if you haven’t already “constructed” it. Nevertheless, 
I think that this diction has not only made it harder to see that the reality of complexity and 
evaluation is even more fraught than the models; I think it has also made it more difficult to 
connect the Kaufmann/Marengo/Frenken kind of enquiries with those that are undertaken by 
other investigators who are, for example, considering the economics and the social psychol-
ogy of collective forms of enquiry. I have tried to insinuate some of these considerations into 
this paper and have given them more attention in my forthcoming Synthese paper, but what 
really remains to be done is to put these two modules together. It will be interesting to see 
whether the modularization permits this. 
The University of Queensland 
March 2008 
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